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Rating:  -
The choice of Generals to review did span much of recorded history, but huge chunks of history were missed. The first third of the book covers only 3 generals in all of recorded history up to 1800. Then the rest of the book (disporportionaly) covers the last 200 years. The review of campaigns was interesting, but some maps showed the flow of battles and others seemed to just be filler. The final two chapters on Rommel and MacArthur were done in too much detail. It became a deluge of unit identifiers and was hard to follow. All the recounts prior to these last two included not just historical review of engagement, but included analysis of what made the generals great -- not the last two recounts. I completely missed why reviewing and repreatedly reminding the reader of MacArthur's grand failure made him a great General? Finally, why were no naval and aviation generals included? Perhaps the book should have been "How Some Great Generals Won Some Ground Wars".
Rating:  -
Bevin Alexander's book may redefine the meaning of "great" commander for some of its readers. A lot of readers are in the same classroom as I when it comes to military history. I grew up accepting that the generals presented to me in history class were the best because my betters said they were. Especially,when it came to the Civil War. They don't cast bronzes of incompetents, right? Maybe, maybe not, but Mr. Alexander did a convincing job explaining why some of history's spotlights are on the wrong statues. A lack of military history won't prevent anyone from reading and enjoying his book. He will set the stage for each adventure and allow the reader to be swept along by the likes of Hannibal, Lawrence of Arabia and Erwin Rommel without loosing him. These stories are real, first class, adventures and that's how Mr. Alexander's book comes across.
Rating:  -
This book takes the reader through time and history as the author describes why certain generals won, or lost their wars. In particular, the author tries to show how certain techniques or tactics used from Ancient Rome to Genghis Khan to Napoleon are still applicable today in the modern world. Indeed, when these tactics are not used, in Korean for example, the author reveals how he feels the generals have let down their men; and their country.
As a primer, this book is good. The author has a good grasp on basic tactics and very interesting facts about history. For example, when fighting armies who have elephants, the Romans had bells with them which they would shake, scarring the beasts and making them useless for the battle.
As I said, overall this book, as a basic guide, is very good. It is not for those who have a solid background in this area already. For me, though, it was very interesting. I particularlly like the earlier chapters. In my view, as the booked came closer to present times, the author's emotions and personal feelings made him less objective. This took away somewhat, from his conclusions but, overall, the book was still a fun read.
Rating:  -
While Mr. Alexander writes in an colorful and gripping style, and the book is an enjoyable read, the few new insights he offers are often on the based on the most frivoulous ground, or simply untrue. For example: hie posit that a naval blockade was what ultimately defeated Germany in WW I is patently false. Germany had for centuries been the 'land power' of Europe - free of any need for supply from precious colonies - while Britain was Europes 'Sea Power.' Even before Bismarck unified Germany, she was quite self-sufficient in the vital raw materials that kept her war machine alive, (albeit vulnerably dependent upon weak allied states for some of these materials,) and in no way shared Britain's vulnerabilty to naval 'strangulation'. It was no accident that the overpopulated Island had long maintained the World's most Powerful Navy, or, that Kaiser Wilhelm II's rash attempt to challenge Britains dominance of the seas was a major contributing factor in Britain's entry into the War. Yet Mr. Alexander mentions 'naval stangulation' as the principle cause of Germany's defeat in WWI, in a short footnote in a chapter detailing Britains ultimately successful campaign against the Turks in Paalestine!
Sherman is his choice for the Unions best General - he is derisive in his treatment of Grant - yet he fails to recognize that the strategy that sent Sherman plunging deep into the South and destroying her capacity to wage war was one formulated by both Grant and Sherman, or, that Johnston's smaller and much more easily outflanked army, was hardly comparable to Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, nor that Grant largely followed same strategy of outmaneuvering his outnumbered opponent, until he had forced Lee to retreat to the Gates of Richmond. Also, with John Bell Hood appointed as the Confederate Commander in the South and Johnston relieved - as Sherman assembled before Atlanta - Sherman faced a rash General that destroyed large parts of his Army in repeated, blundering assaults. One might mention Grant's foolhardy and costly assault at Cold Harbor, yet Grant learned from this mistake - and with Lee Penned within the Richmond/Petersburg defenses - he skillfully expanded his breastworks around Peterburg until the smaller Confederate force was forced to retreat, leading durectly to Union victory. Sherman - while a brilliant General - faced no such tactical genius as Lee, and took Atlanta with comparative ease...
Such is the nature of the book: Mr. Alexander makes passing points - which are enormously debatable or simply false, (i.e., Britains naval blockade of Germany as what ultimately won WW I for the Allies,) or he simply rehashes famous military campaigns. All in all a work of mediocrity.
Rating: -
Bevin Alexander's book is an easy read, and he does a solid job supporting his theses about why certain General's were very successful. I doubt that anyone will agree with everyone of his selections of Generals and campaigns, but this book can serve as a good starting point for discussions about strategic planning for success in warfare.
I had some problems with the authors selections (of course who are the great generals throughout the ages is a matter of opinion), and some of the overall conclusions in certain campaigns. For example, Mr. Alexander states that Lincoln would not have won re-elction unless Sherman captured Atlanta before the election without fully supporting the argument. Instead, he simply states this opinion as fact. Also, the maps were a little lacking at times. I agree with a previous reviewer that more detail on the maps would have helped.
Despite these shortcomings, I recommend this book for any military history bookgroup looking a book to generate discussion about military strategy, or anyone looking for a nice addition to their military history library.
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